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Abstract
Purpose – The goal of this paper is to suggest a new incentive model that is capable of creating the
conditions for the autonomous growth of diffusion and credibility of the ISO 9000 national quality
certiﬁcation system.
Design/methodology/approach – The ﬁrst part of this work contains some considerations about
the general interest of organisations in quality certiﬁcation systems, emphasising the advantages and
the drawbacks in being certiﬁed. Next, the attention shifts to future scenarios. Speciﬁcally, a new
model is proposed that is capable of encouraging certiﬁed organisations (COs) and certiﬁcation bodies
(CBs) that operate blamelessly and seriously, while at the same time penalising those that do not.
Findings – The suggested model consists of two inter-connected sub-models relative to COs and CBs,
respectively. Each sub-model includes different states with different incentives/penalties. The
switch-over from one state to another depends on the practical results recorded in recent years by the
CO/CB of interest. The switching rules are based on a set of objective, transparent, and
non-manipulable indicators.
Research limitations/implications – On-site analyses and simulations are necessary so as to tune
optimal switching rules to balance the whole model.
Practical implications – The (possible) future implementation of the model could have great
impact on COs’ and CBs’ modi operandi, promoting the real implementation of quality management
practices but – at the same time – not requiring signiﬁcant additional effort from the state and the
authorities accrediting/controlling CBs.
Originality/value – The proposed model is absolutely new and may represent a proper way to
combine the interests and expectations of COs and CBs into a unique “virtuous circle” for improving
the real implementation of quality management.
Keywords ISO 9000 series, Quality management, Quality assessment, Incentives (psychology)
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Since its introduction in 1987, the ISO 9000 series of quality standards has spread all
over the world. An indirect sign of the popularity of these standards is the large
number of articles in the scientiﬁc literature that are addressed to them. Some of the
most relevant concern:
. analysis of the motivations for certiﬁcation (Poksinska et al., 2002; Douglas et al.,
2003; Magd and Curry, 2003; Williams, 2004; Heras, 2006; Heras et al., 2006);
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DOI 10.1108/02656711111121799. analysis of the beneﬁts of certiﬁcation, the evolution of organisations’
perceptions of these beneﬁts, and obstacles/drawbacks to certiﬁcation
(Gotzamani and Tsiotras, 2002; Llopis and Tarı ´, 2003; Tarı ´ and Sabater, 2004;
Casadesu ´s and Karapetrovic, 2005a; Boiral and Roy, 2007; Zeng et al., 2007;
Karapetrovic et al., 2010);
. the impact of quality certiﬁcation on the organisational and ﬁnancial
performance of companies (Alvarez et al., 2002; Chow-Chua et al., 2003; Conca
et al., 2004; Casadesu ´s and Karapetrovic, 2005b; Dick et al., 2006);
. possible integration and/or competition between quality certiﬁcation and TQM
(Dwyer, 2002; Martı ´nez-Lorente and Martı ´nez-Costa, 2004; Karapetrovic et al.,
2006); and
. analysis and forecasting of the diffusion of certiﬁcation (Franceschini et al., 2004,
2006; Albuquerque et al., 2007; Franceschini et al., 2008, 2010).
A large number of studies concerning these topics are mentioned and discussed in
detail in the recent review paper by Sampaio et al. (2009). On the basis of a worldwide
analysis, two distinct tendencies emerge:
(1) In recent years, the number of certiﬁed companies in some Eastern countries,
such as China and India, has increased very rapidly – even more rapidly than
occurred in some European countries at the end of the last century (Corbett,
2008). A representative example is Pakistan (Malik and YeZhua, 2006).
(2) A tendency to saturation and/or decline has been seen in countries where
certiﬁcations were traditionally more diffuse in terms of the percentage of
certiﬁed organisations (COs) (International Organisation for Standardisation,
2009). For example, in the UK, Ireland and Denmark, in the last ﬁve to six years
this tendency has degenerated into a reduction of the total number of certiﬁed
companies. This phenomenon is known as “decertiﬁcation”. In future, a similar
tendency will probably occur in other European countries where certiﬁcations
are popular and largely diffused, such as Belgium, France, Germany and
Sweden (International Organisation for Standardisation, 2009; Franceschini
et al., 2010).
Some of the possible reasons for this initial decline include:
. the perception of little incentive towards improvement;
. the bureaucratic burden in the application of ISO 9000 standards; and
. the apparent lack of advantages for organisations with a well-rooted quality
culture.
These (and other) aspects contribute to the so-called “erosion of perceived beneﬁts”
related to ISO 9000 certiﬁcation. For a detailed explanation, we refer the reader to the
relevant literature (Casadesu ´s and Karapetrovic, 2005a, b; Marimon et al., 2009;
Karapetrovic et al., 2010).
The goal of this paper is to suggest a new incentive model to ISO certiﬁcation that is
capable of favouring those COs and certiﬁcation bodies (CBs) that operate seriously
and blamelessly. The basic elements of this model are:
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the quality certiﬁcation system;
. creating an interest in certiﬁcation in those countries where it seems to have
decreased; and
. favouring the effective implementation of quality within COs.
This model, which is based on incentives and penalties, is inspired by the MIL STD
105E standard (Duncan, 1994; Montgomery, 2009). The criteria used to
incentivise/penalise COs and CBs respond to three primary characteristics:
(1) objectivity;
(2) transparency; and
(3) non-manipulability.
The remainder of the paper is organised into three sections. Section 2 summarises the
major beneﬁts and criticalities of the current quality certiﬁcation system. Section 3
presents and discusses in detail the new incentive model, showing an example of
application based on realistic data. Section 4 contains further comments and reﬂections
on the potential beneﬁts and drawbacks derived from the practical application of the
model. Finally, the conclusions are given, summarising the original contribution of the
paper and future research directions.
2. Strengths and criticalities of the national certiﬁcation systems
The following subsections summarise the strengths and weak points of the current
national certiﬁcation system. These considerations are derived from the large scientiﬁc
literature on the matter. A typical national certiﬁcation scheme is represented
synthetically in Figure 1 (Rodholma and Drora, 1993).
2.1 Beneﬁts of certiﬁcation
In the scientiﬁc literature there is plenty of debate on the quality certiﬁcation beneﬁts
to COs (Corbett et al., 2002). The classiﬁcation suggested by Sampaio et al. (2009) is
particularly effective. Quality certiﬁcation beneﬁts and motivations are classiﬁed in
two main categories:
(1) internal; and
(2) external.
Figure 1.
Simpliﬁed representation
of the current national ISO
9000 certiﬁcation scheme
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366Internal beneﬁts are related to the goal of achieving organisational improvement, while
external beneﬁts are mainly related to promotional and marketing issues, customer
pressures, improvement of market share, etc. (see Table I).
Summarising the most common positions, it generally appears that the ISO 9000
series of standards represents a good guide for implementing a basic quality system
within companies that are in the initial stages of their quality journey. In other words,
certiﬁcation may represent a milestone for introducing a new organisational modus
operandi, especially for those companies where a quality culture is not well-rooted
(Dahlgaard et al., 1998). In the literature, there is a consensual opinion that beneﬁts are
related to company certiﬁcation motivations, i.e. when certiﬁcation is seen as an
opportunity for long-term improvement of internal processes and systems, the derived
beneﬁts are fulﬁlled on a more global dimension (Brown et al., 1998).
Apart from the advantages for public or private organisations, it should be noticed
that certiﬁcation is a potential advantage for the whole national state: a large number
of COs should mean better competitiveness of the overall production system. This is
the reason why quality certiﬁcation is encouraged by the governments of many
different countries (Masternak and Kleiner, 1995).
2.2 Critical aspects of the current system
The national quality certiﬁcation system has some critical aspects that can be
associated to the involved actors, i.e. organisations to be certiﬁed; CBs and quality
auditors; and authorities accrediting and controlling CBs.
2.2.1 Difﬁcult interpretation. ISO 9000 standards are applied to many different kinds
of organisation. This is the reason why these standards are deliberately
general-purpose. According to some, they are sometimes rather abstract and not
easily interpretable, particularly for those areas in which they are not largely diffused.
For example, among the most unusual COs can be found police departments (USA),
professional soccer teams (Mexico) and city councils (UK). Correct interpretation can be
problematic, not only for organisations to be certiﬁed, but also for quality auditors,
because they may not necessarily have the necessary expertise required to range over a
wide variety of different ﬁelds. To limit this problem, over time, various industry
External beneﬁts Internal beneﬁts
Access to new markets Productivity improvements
Corporate image improvement Product defect rate decreases
Market share improvement Quality awareness improvements
ISO 9000 certiﬁcation as a marketing tool
Customer relationship improvements
Customer satisfaction
Customer communication improvements
Deﬁnition of the personnel responsibilities and
obligations
Delivery time improvements
Internal organisation improvements
Non-conformities decrease
Customer complaints decrease
Internal communication improvements
Product quality improvement
Competitive advantage improvement
Personnel motivation
Source: Adapted from Sampaio et al. (2009)
Table I.
Most commonly stated
ISO 9000 certiﬁcation
beneﬁts reported in the
literature
National quality
certiﬁcation
367sectors have integrated ISO 9000 with other standards, for example QS 9000 and
ISO/TS 16949:2002 in the automotive sector, AS 9000 in the aerospace industry, TL
9000 in the telecommunications industry, etc.
2.2.2 Evaluation heterogeneity. Despite training, the rules given by the accreditation
authorities and periodical controls, it is not rare to observe heterogeneity and lack of
objectivity in the audits/evaluations. Each auditor, depending on his “professional
sensitivity” and background, tends to focus his attention on certain quality aspects,
neglecting others (Karapetrovic and Willborn, 2002; Franceschini et al., 2007). The
practical result is that evaluations are sometimes heterogeneous. Although we are
aware of the fact that this problem will never be solved completely, it should be noted
that it often raises some perplexity with respect to CBs and – as a consequence – to the
practice of quality certiﬁcation.
2.2.3 Role and conduct of CBs. The boundary between the role of an auditor and that
of a consultant is ﬁne. In some cases, the “privileged relationship” between an
organisation and an auditor/consultant may degenerate in a kind of “settlement”. This
behaviour should be discouraged, because of the inherent conﬂict of interests
(International Organisation for Standardisation, 2006).
Fortunately, these situations are not so frequent, but they do have a huge negative
impact on CBs’ credibility (Conti, 2004). Undoubtedly, the origin of this “distorted”
behaviour is the economic junction between organisations and CBs. The CBs’ interest
in attracting more and more organisations to certify may degenerate into the situation
described above.
2.2.4 Little incentive toward improvement. For some organisations with a
consolidated culture of quality management, ISO 9000 does not necessarily
represent the “ﬁrst choice” as a quality standard. Other “alternative”
awards/standards/programs for quality (such as the Malcolm Baldrige Award,
TQM, EFQM) are relatively diffused and, in some cases, may appear more suitable for
the implementation of continuous improvement (Sun et al., 2004; European Foundation
for Quality Management, 2009). According to some organisations, they provide an
additional distinction, especially in those markets in which ISO 9000 standards are
relatively diffused and many organisations are certiﬁed.
3. Proposal for an incentive model
Here we present an incentive model, which is aimed at encouraging:
. a re-increase of the value of ISO 9000 certiﬁcates;
. the diffusion of a culture of quality;
. the real and constant implementation of good quality practices within
organisations; and
. the autonomous development of the whole system of quality.
At the same time, it should favour CBs that operate with zeal and rigour, and penalise
those that release certiﬁcates “too accommodatingly”. In order to reach this ambitious
goal, we conceived a dynamic/adaptive model, which is inspired by the MIL-STD-105E
standard (Weber, 1991; Juran and Gryna, 1993; Duncan, 1994; Montgomery, 2009). This
standard is used to support the design of acceptance sampling plans for controlling the
quality of lots of products. Three inspection levels with different
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depending on the result (i.e. lot defectiveness) of previous inspections. When the results
are good, the inspection severity decreases; when the results worsen, the inspection
severity increases, along with inspection time and costs. The switching procedures are
illustrated in Figure 2.
A similar adaptive logic can be “exported” to the national quality certiﬁcation
framework. The following subsections illustrate two inter-connected incentive
sub-models, promoting the growth/development of COs and CBs, respectively. We
point out that, at the present time, the values and parameters of the model should be
considered purely as a rough guide.
3.1 Sub-model for COs
Each CO lies in one of three possible states, depending on the practical results recorded
in recent years (see Figure 3). The sub-model also provides some procedures/rules for
switching from one state to another. The rules are based on a set of objective,
transparent, easily determinable, not bureaucratically burdensome, and
non-manipulable indicators (Franceschini et al., 2007). The three possible states are:
(1) critical (CCO);
(2) normal (NCO); and
(3) virtuous (VCO).
Transfers from one state to the other are regulated by speciﬁc incentives/penalties.
State NCO includes those organisations that have been certiﬁed for the ﬁrst time. In
this state, there is no incentive or disincentive related to the cost of periodical certiﬁcate
renewal. From state NCO there are two possible switching procedures:
Figure 2.
Graphical representation
of the switching rules for
normal, tightened and
reduced inspection in the
MIL-STD-105E standard,
to support the design of
acceptance sampling plans
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Incentive sub-model to
support the growth/
development of COs
IJQRM
28,4
370(1) To VCO, when the following three conditions are satisﬁed at the same time, for
two consecutive years:
. no recourse to redundancy payment or other social safety valves;
. no reduction in the organisation’s net proﬁt; and
. non-negative balance between new recruits and dismissed persons.
(2) To CCO, if at least two out of the four following conditions are not satisﬁed in
each of the last two years:
. no recourse to redundancy payment or other social safety valves;
. no reduction of the organisation’s net proﬁt;
. non-negative balance between new recruits and dismissed persons; and
. no suppliers or customers denounce the organisation for “bad behaviour”
with reference to the dictates of ISO 9000 standards (and this “bad
behaviour” is later established by the control authority).
State CCO includes those organisations that are already certiﬁed and, in recent years,
have been distinguished by negative results in terms of proﬁt, job creation and/or
their relationship with suppliers/customers. These organisations are considered
“under observation” and are strongly invited to change their course quickly. In this
state, there is a disincentive represented by the increased cost for periodical
certiﬁcate renewal, to be paid to the committed CB. From CCO there are two possible
switching procedures:
(1) To NCO, if the three conditions for switching from NCO to VCO are satisﬁed at the
same time, in each of the last two years.
(2) If an organisation persists in “negative” behaviours, then it will lose the right to
renew its certiﬁcate and will be temporarily “expelled” (for one year) from the
certiﬁcation system. This expulsion is effected when two out of the same four
conditions for switching from NCO to CCO are not satisﬁed in each of the last
three years.
The most probable consequences of expulsion for a CO are damage to its image and the
loss of customers, in particular those customers who require that their suppliers are
certiﬁed. However, we believe that this punishment is necessary since it acts as a
stimulus for future improvement and a deterrent to avoid bad conduct by COs.
Moreover, it represents a form of “protection” for virtuous COs and the entire
certiﬁcation system.
As a further stimulus to improvement, an organisation that wants to re-enter
the system after being previously excluded, is readmitted in state CCO instead of
NCO.
State VCO includes those COs that in recent years have obtained positive results
from the point of view of proﬁt, job creation and fairness to customers/suppliers. The
incentive for those organisations is represented by the cancellation of the cost of
periodical certiﬁcate renewal to be paid to the CB of interest. If an organisation in VCO
does not maintain its “good behaviour” over time, it is relegated to NCO. In particular,
this downgrading changeover is performed when one (or more) of the following
conditions is not satisﬁed in each of the last two consecutive years:
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. no reduction in the organisation’s net proﬁt; or
. non-negative balance between new recruits and dismissed persons.
It can be seen that the whole sub-model encourages organisations to reach VCO. Thus,
it would yield clear beneﬁts for the country, both in terms of job creation and a
reduction in the use of social safety valves. On the other hand, this growth would seem
to produce an apparent disadvantage for CBs, due to the non-payment of renewal fees
from VCO organisations. In the next subsection we show how this apparent
“inconvenience” is counterbalanced.
The two-year period to switch from one state to another appears to be a
reasonable compromise solution. A longer period could make the model
insufﬁciently responsive, since one CO may perhaps not be assigned to the state
that best reﬂects its current condition. On the other hand, a shorter period could
make the model too sensitive, leading to overly frequent switchovers from one state
to another, due to ﬂuctuations of the moment (e.g. in the net proﬁt or staff numbers,
related to the seasonal effects) and not necessarily attributable to the actual state of
health of the CO. However, optimal time periods will be deﬁned after on-site
analyses and simulations.
3.2 Sub-model for CBs
This sub-model is similar to the one for COs and is aimed at incentivising the most
zealous CBs, penalising the “less fair” ones (see Figure 4).
In this case there are two possible states – i.e. critical (CCB) and virtuous (VCB)–
which are based on the assumptions that:
. virtuous CBs generally certify organisations adopting virtuous behaviours; and
. less fair CBs give certiﬁcates to organisations that do not implement quality
effectively.
A CB enters VCB when, considering the last two-year period, the following two
conditions are satisﬁed:
. 5 per cent (or more) reduction in the percentage of COs (certiﬁed by the CB of
interest) in CCO; and
. 5 per cent (or more) increase in the percentage of COs (certiﬁed by the CB of
interest) in VCO.
The incentive for the organisations of VCB is represented by a tax allowance (for
instance, reduction of 10 per cent of the taxable income).
A CB is downgraded to state CCB if, considering the last two-year period, at least one
of the following conditions is satisﬁed:
. 5 per cent (or more) increase in the percentage of COs (certiﬁed by the CB of
interest) in CCO; and
. 10 per cent (or more) reduction in the percentage of COs (certiﬁed by the CB of
interest) in VCO.
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Incentive sub-model to
support the growth/
development of CBs
National quality
certiﬁcation
373Since for CBs in the CCB state, there is no tax allowance, the advantage in gaining a
“promotion” from CCB to VCB is clear. To incentivise CBs to work well just from the
beginning, a new CB entering the model will start from CCB.
Finally, a CB that remains in CCB for morethan ﬁve consecutive years is temporarily
expelled from the system (for one year), because of the evident incapacity to improve.
Possible consequences of expulsion are image damage and loss of customers, due to the
“forced break” of activity of the CB. On the other hand, these expulsions may protect
CBs that operate blamelessly.
Differently from the sub-model for COs, this sub-model has only two states (VCB and
CCB), without an intermediate “limbo”, such as state NCO for the ﬁrst sub-model. The
reason is that, according to us, evaluating the effect of the work of CBs deserves great
resolution and responsiveness, since CBs are supposed to be a guide for COs. Moreover,
unless there is the risk of expulsion, it is noteworthy that state CCB is not particularly
severe since it is not associated to any disincentive.
Since the sub-model for CBs includes only two states, there is a potential ease of
overturning in a relatively limited time period of two years. This feature may
contribute to reduce the risk of generating a possible monopoly situation of some
virtuous CBs.
3.3 Application example
To better understand how the two suggested sub-models work, two application
examples are presented here. The ﬁrst (see Figure 5) shows the progress of a
hypothetical CO, depending on its performance in terms of:
. recourse to social safety valves;
. balance between new recruits and dismissed workers;
. net proﬁt; and
. bad behaviour established by the control authority.
The example is based on realistic data, considering a 20-year period.
For the purpose of example, the shift from NCO to CCO in the third year is a
consequence of the negative balance between new recruits and dismissed workers in
Figure 5.
Application example of
the incentive sub-model to
a hypothetical CO
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recourse to social safety valves in the second year. On the other hand, the shift from
NCO to VCO in the 18th year is due to the fact that, in the two previous consecutive
years, the performance of the organisation has been positive with respect to the
performance indicators of interest.
Similarly, let us consider a hypothetical CB with a certain portfolio of COs. Table II
reports the yearly percentage of COs in the states VCO,N CO and CCO, for 20 consecutive
years.
Figure 6 shows the progress of the CB of interest, depending on the evolution of the
corresponding COs. For the purpose of example, the shift from CCB to VCB in the
11th year is a consequence of the fact that, in the last two years, the percentage of COs
in CCO reduced by 7 per cent, while the percentage of COs in VCO increased by 6 per
cent. In contrast, the shift from VCB to CCB in the 20th year is determined by the fact
that, in the last two years, the percentage of COs in CCO increased by 7 per cent.
4. Further reﬂections on the proposed model
The suggested model is aimed at combining the personal interest of COs and CBs in a
joint course towards the progressive growth. Also, it may improve many of the critical
aspects discussed in section 2. In particular, it could:
. encourage COs to give greater importance to the actual implementation of
quality practices;
. discourage “bad behaviours” of COs and CBs and stimulate their improvement;
and
. increase credibility of COs, CBs and the whole certiﬁcation system.
Major beneﬁts, with particular reference to the traditional certiﬁcation procedure, are
summarised in Table III.
Concerning the logic and the practical effects of the model, it is worth noting the
following aspects:
. Virtuous organisations (in VCO) enjoy an economic incentive, consisting of the
non-payment of periodic certiﬁcate renewal fees to CBs. The state, “in return” for
the tax allowances for virtuous CBs, receives the beneﬁt of having more growing
organisations that do not recur to social safety valves and tend to create an
increasing number of jobs. On the one hand, organisations that are in the CCO
state apparently seem to favour CBs, due to the increased cost for their periodic
certiﬁcate renewal. In the long term, conversely, these organisations will tend to
penalise CBs and to make them switch to the CCB state. The aim of the model,
consequently, is to encourage the pursuit of long-term advantages for a global
system consisting of certiﬁed organisations, CBs and states. In view of the
beneﬁt produced, this model does not reasonably burden the state and does not
represent a type of undisputed “charity” for virtuous CBs. In addition, the model
is relatively agile and does not signiﬁcantly increase bureaucracy. One of the
most important effects is that CBs and auditors would be strongly discouraged to
release their certiﬁcation “too easily”.
. In this preliminary analysis, the attention is focused on the philosophy behind
the suggested model, rather than the precise and complete deﬁnition of the
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Table II.
Yearly percentage of the
COs (certiﬁed by a
hypothetical CB) in the
states VCO,N CO and CCO,
considering a 20-year
period
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376corresponding parameters and switching rules. In future, speciﬁc analyses and
simulations will be carried out so as to identify the optimal parameters and
switching rules to balance the whole model. For example, some indicators could
be modiﬁed or replaced by others that prove to be better. This aspect will be
essential for the possible adoption and acceptance of the model by the actors
involved in it.
. The two sub-models are very different in terms of switching rules: the ﬁrst
focuses on the performance of a speciﬁc CO, while the second focuses on the
group performance of the COs certiﬁed by a speciﬁc CB. The link between the
two models is that the “survival” of a CO depends on its own practical
performance, while the one of a CB depends on the practical results achieved by
the organisations that it certiﬁes.
. Ap o s s i b l ec r i t i c i s mo ft h ep r o p o s e dm o d e li st h a tc r i t e r i af o r
incentivising/penalising COs (recourse to social valves, lay-offs, etc.) are not
necessarily correlated to the organisations’ compliance with ISO 9000
certiﬁcation requirements. We believe that this potential objection can be
turned into a practical improvement of the current system of certiﬁcation. In fact,
Figure 6.
Application example of
the incentive sub-model to
a hypothetical CB
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377one of the most common criticisms of ISO 9000 standards is that COs do not
necessarily implement quality because of the lack of a link between potential
quality (conformance to certiﬁcation requisites) and real quality (real
implementation of quality procedures and good practices) (Wade, 2002).
Consequently, the fact that the model considers some aspects beyond ISO 9000
standards is not a limit, but rather a new way to enhance and complete the whole
certiﬁcation system.
. Another possible criticism is that there are several reasons why both COs and
CBs could change their state, whether or not they are committed to quality; for
example, general economic crisis, ﬁnancial speculation, favourable economic
environment, new investments, etc. However, we believe that in the medium to
long term, COs that are committed to quality are reasonably intended to be
healthy and tocontributeto the wealth of their own country, independently of the
causes of external inﬂuences.
. With some modiﬁcations to the switching procedures and indicators in use,
similar models could be created for other certiﬁcation systems, such as ISO 14000
certiﬁcation, EFQM, the Malcolm Baldrige Award, etc. (Pyzdek, 2003). For
example, regarding ISO 14000 standards, switching rules should be focused on
indicators of the environmental impact of the organisation.
Beneﬁts/advantages
Traditional
procedure
Suggested
model Comments
“Dynamic”
discrimination of COs
No Yes According to the new model, each CO is
associated to one of three possible states
(CCO,N CO and VCO), depending on the
practical results recorded in recent years
“Dynamic”
discrimination of CBs
No Yes According to the new model, each CB is
associated to one of two possible states (CCB
and VCB), depending on the performance of
the corresponding COs
Cost for periodic
certiﬁcation renewal
Fixed Variable According to the new model, the cost for
periodic certiﬁcate renewal – charged to
COs – may change, depending on their
state
Tax allowance for
“virtuous” CBs
No Yes CBs with a relatively large portion of
virtuous COs enjoy a tax allowance
Favourable social
effects
Weak Strong The new model encourages COs not to
recur to social valves and to create new jobs
Role of accreditation
authority
The same The same The new model does not entail any
additional task/activity bythe accreditation
authority
Link between potential
quality and real quality
Weak Strong This aspect, which is one of the disputed
imperfections of the traditional ISO 9000
certiﬁcation system, is encouraged by the
new model
Table III.
Summary of major
beneﬁts of the suggested
model, with reference to
the traditional quality
certiﬁcation procedure
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378. The new model and MIL-STD-105E (i.e. the standard that inspired it) are totally
different in terms of application context. Despite this, a parallel between them
can be drawn. MIL-STD-105E introduces a mechanism by which the severity
related to the sampling inspection of lots received from a supplier may change
depending on the result of previous inspections. This makes the inspection
system ﬂexible and encourages suppliers to provide products of good quality.
Similarly, the new model incentivises COs that really improve, as well as CBs
that do not release certiﬁcations “too easily”.
5. Conclusions
The reﬂections included in the ﬁrst part of the paper provide an interpretation of the
current trends concerning the diffusion of national quality certiﬁcations. While, on the
onehand,the recoursetocertiﬁcationsisincreasing intheEastern countries,ontheother
hand, it tends to saturate in some countries of the “Old Continent”. The case of the UK is
emblematic and makes you think. It seems that once a certain reputation and market
share are gained, the role of certiﬁcation tends to decline. In some cases, the beneﬁts of
certiﬁcation do not respond to expectations, especially for organisations with a
consolidated culture of quality. In other (worst) cases, the importance of certiﬁcation is
not at all perceived, to the point of being considered as a superﬂuous burden.
To contrast this phenomenon it is worthwhile reacting. The greatest challenge is to
identify a proper way to combine the interest and expectations of CBs and COs into a
unique “virtuous circle” for improving the real implementation of quality management.
The introduction of a model based on incentives/penalties is aimed at encouraging the
autonomous growth of the actors involved in the national quality system (COs, CBs
and state), focalising the attention on the advantages that a correct implementation of
quality may produce for them.
The suggested model consists of two interconnected sub-models, relative to COs and
CBs, respectively. Each sub-model includes different states with different
incentives/penalties. The switchover from one state to another depends on the practical
results, recorded in the last years by the CO/CB of interest. The link between the two
models is that the “survival” of a COdepends on itsown practical performance, while that
of a CB depends on the practical results achieved by the organisations that it certiﬁes.
Switching rules are based on a set of objective, transparent, and non-manipulable
indicators. In future, on-site analyses and simulations will be carried out so as to
identify optimal switching rules to balance the whole model.
To conclude, we think that the suggested model could represent the missing link
between potential quality (conformance to certiﬁcation requisites) and real quality (real
implementation of quality procedures and good practices). Moreover, its
implementation would not require signiﬁcant additional effort from the state and
the authorities accrediting and controlling CBs.
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